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Abstract 
 
Voter identification (ID) laws were introduced into the American electoral system during 
the 1970s, but have garnered more widespread attention in recent years and have expanded to 
over 30 states as of 2018. Critics have claimed that these laws are discriminatory toward several 
groups of voters. Given the supposed relationship between voter ID laws and voter turnout, a 
contemporary quantitative analysis of this connection should be examined. This analysis will 
improve existing election law and voting behavior literature by providing recent analyses and 
data using a quantitative approach with difference-in-difference regression tests. Using data 
provided by the Current Population Survey, individual Sectary of State office archives, and 
county-level election boards, this paper measures county-level voter turnout differences in the 
2014, 2016, and 2018 election cycles, while controlling for voter ID law implementation and 
other state-level demographic variables. I concentrate my tests on states that have applied a voter 
ID law between 2014 and 2018. This analysis finds that states with voter ID laws impact voter 
turnout in negative and positive directions, which all suggests a larger strategy to ensure 
Republican victories in historically competitive states.   
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Introduction 
On June 21, 2012, House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi commented on the rise of voter 
identification (ID) laws in the United States, stating that the rise “is no accident. It is no 
coincidence. It is a plan on the part of Republicans.”1 Congresswoman Barbara Lee of California 
concurred, and added that Republicans are “pushing laws designed to change election outcomes 
by reducing voting, repressing turnout…this is the exact opposite of where our country needs to 
go."2 As indicated by these politicians, many obstacles have been created to limit voters from 
casting ballots in the increasingly polarized and political American election system. According to 
the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), there are presently 35 states that have 
laws “requesting or requiring voters to show some form of identification” at polling places,3 all 
of which were introduced in the 1970s and proliferated following the outcome of the highly 
contentious 2000 presidential election. Since this election, voter ID laws, along with redistricting 
procedures, criminal conviction laws, and early voting reforms have been implemented in these 
various states and have been justified by politicians as being a means of protecting the public 
from irregularities in the voting system.4  
For instance, South Carolina Governor Nikki Haley signed a bill into law in 2011 
requesting photo ID at the polls, justifying it thusly: “If you can show a picture to buy Sudafed, if 
you can show a picture to get on an airplane, you should be able to show a picture ID to (vote).”5 
Myrtle Beach Tea Party Chairman Joe Dugan agrees, “If we don’t have integrity at the ballot 
box, we don’t have it anywhere.”6 Understanding the political significance of voter ID laws is 
essential, given how politically salient the subject matter was in the recent 2018 midterm 
election. In fact, after Democrat Stacey Abrams was narrowly defeated in the 2018 gubernatorial 
election in Georgia by the state’s Republican Secretary of State Brian Kemp, she founded Fair 
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Fight 2020, an organization which aims to promote voter turnout for the upcoming 2020 election. 
In her own words, Abrams claims that Georgia’s voter ID laws are designed to “scare people out 
of voting” and that it plays a role in discriminating against minority voters.7 Not only do 
Abrams’ comments reflect the current political relevance of this topic, but they also emphasize 
the need to examine the intentions and consequences of these laws on millions of citizens across 
the country and why they are impacting voter turnout. 
The kind of rhetoric and laws present in Georgia are also found in states across the 
country, which all ultimately leads to the main research question presented in this paper: What 
effect do voter ID laws have on voter turnout in the elections between 2014 and 2018? This 
paper will aim to answer this question by analyzing voter ID laws and their effect on voter 
turnout in the major elections of 2014, 2016, and 2018, specifically examining the changes at the 
county level in politically diverse states that hosted competitive races. Overall, I predict that the 
demographic groups controlled in my regression models will experience lower turnout rates 
because of a voter ID law’s implementation during these election cycles. 
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Literature Review 
I. The State of the American Election and The Voting Rights Act 
In order to understand the dynamics of the present-day American election system, all 
facets and components of the electoral system will be analyzed to comprehend the methods that 
attribute to voter turnout during these three elections, which will inform and motivate my 
hypothesis. To illustrate the origins of voter identification laws and policies, I will review recent 
legal and political decisions that resulted in the enactment of these new voting requirements. 
Although many of these laws originated in the 1970s, Mebane points to the 2000 presidential 
election between Governor George W. Bush and Vice President Al Gore as the beginning of the 
proliferation these laws, claiming that more than 50,000 votes were discarded from consideration 
in Florida because of processing errors in tabulating the results.8 Contextually, the 2000 Florida 
election resulted in the difference of 537 votes out of the 6 million casted, thus making it one of 
the most decisive elections in modern American history.9 In his paper, Mebane investigates 
Florida’s voting behavior by estimating overvote proportions for Bush and Gore and how these 
ballots compared to those casted for a single candidate.10 Mebane finds that 68% of the casted 
overvotes were in favor of Al Gore and if these votes were tabulated properly, then Al Gore 
would have been declared the winner of Florida’s election by over 30,000 votes.11 Following the 
2000 election, President Bush passed the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002, aiming to 
reduce levels of overvotes and undervotes by replacing the faulty punch card system, which 
would conceivably reduce the possibility of a close election scenario happening again in Florida. 
While Mebane’s strengths lie in this data collection of local precincts, I believe Mebane’s study 
is limited in scope by only concentrating on Florida during the 2000 presidential election, which 
eliminates the analysis of other close states during that election year like New Hampshire and 
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Nevada. Even though examining Florida in the 2000 election is very helpful in realizing the 
state’s faulty election system, it does make it challenging to generalize the results of other 
elections following 2000. My study aims to correct this shortcoming by expanding the scope and 
analyzing the county-level data of multiple competitive states and elections, including Florida’s 
recent elections.  
Hopps & Bowles provide context to Mebane’s study by exploring the “gutting” of the 
Voting Rights Act of 1964 (VRA), which resulted from the 2013 United States Supreme Court 
decision Shelby County v. Holder. Originally, federal procedures were put in place to monitor the 
voting registration and polling in certain states where preclearance was enacted, which improved 
voting access as the federal government was more involved in the process. But in June of 2013, 
Section 4(b) of the 1965 VRA, principally the preclearance provisions, was invalidated by the 
Supreme Court in Shelby County v. Holder.12  In a 5-4 decision, the Court decided that Congress' 
decision in 2006 to reauthorize the preclearance requirement, without modifying the coverage 
formula, was unconstitutional, meaning that the federal government no longer had to clear 
districts when new laws were being created. The Court stated that the coverage formula's 
application did not relate to the principle of equal sovereignty among the states. In the majority 
opinion, Chief Justice John Roberts writes that the coverage formula was "based on forty-year 
old facts having no logical relation to the present day,”13 which almost ignores the fact that 
preclearance led to increases in minority participation. This decision reverberates even today 
with the increases in voter ID laws and the disenfranchisement of thousands of voters following 
this decision, which Mebane and Hopps & Bowles emphasize in their papers. Hopps & Bowles 
depart from Mebane’s study by incorporating virtually no data quantitative design structure, but 
instead concentrate primarily on the historical substance rather than quantitative scientific 
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inquiry. In fact, these authors warn about the consequences from these historic actions, including 
that these changes are eroding civil rights gains.14 Nevertheless, much of Hopps and Bowles’ 
work illuminates the importance of the Shelby County v. Holder decision by detailing its contents 
and the kind of repercussions it has on the voting system today, which further enhances my 
understanding of the history of these changes in the voting system. 
 
II. Redistricting 
The “gutting” of the VRA resulted in states and election administrations behaving with 
political motives, specifically in regards to redistricting voting districts. I explore this connection 
in greater detail by reviewing scholars like Abramowitz et al., who analyze the party votes of 
safe and competitive House districts between 2000 and 2002 in order to assess the dangers that 
incumbents face when running for reelection where redistricting is a factor.15 The authors cite 
Governor Schwarzenegger of California as an example of a public official claiming that 
redistricting has made the electoral system biased for one party. Abramowitz et al. assert that 
“the solution, the critics say, is to transfer responsibility for drawing state legislative and 
congressional districts from the Legislature to independent, nonpartisan commissions such as the 
panel of retired judges proposed by Schwarzenegger.”16 These authors conclude that redistricting 
is the result of three factors: shifts in elected officials not sharing the values of their 
constituencies, increasing political polarization, and incumbents’ financial advantage. In other 
words, the authors study how the elements of redistricting, political polarization, and financial 
advantages aim to create political gains, but they do not seem to consider redistricting as an 
influence on minority turnout or even the influence of electoral competition involved with this 
process. The Center for Public Justice speaks to this point and reports that competitive elections 
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are a major component that drives voter turnout.17 My paper attempts to correct Abramowitz et 
al.’s drawbacks by analyzing how voter ID laws in competitive states particularly affect the 
turnout of racial and minority groups.  
Similar to Abramowitz et al.’s article, Gopian & West tackle the redistricting efforts 
made in the 1982 House Elections by focusing on the particular strategy established in these 
races.18 To begin, Gopian & West criticize the methodology of existing literature addressing 
redistricting, and instead these authors use “individual districts as the unit of analysis and draws 
on previously unexamined data,” which the authors claim will reveal substantial differences 
between aggregate and district-level approaches to testing data.19 In examining the systematic 
advantages and disadvantages in the redistricting of state legislatures in 1982, Gopian & West 
stress how strategic planning was critical for Republicans to obtain districts that were more 
favorable to them after the redistricting process.20 Citing other researchers and scholars, these 
authors continue exploring the strategic process behind redistricting by finding that in 1982, the 
“Republican party had gone to extraordinary lengths to recruit and fundable, attractive 
candidates…[to circumvent] Reagan's low popularity ratings and the economy's slow 
recovery,”21 implying that the strategy behind redistricting is reactionary and partisan. Gopian & 
West conclude that “redistricting effects depended on the strategic calculations of candidates and 
party leaders” and that there are numerous approaches strategists could take to win an election 
through redistricting.22 Gopian & West add to Abramowitz et al.’s study by providing several 
explanations of strategy being a design for redistricting. I find that these authors succeed in 
evaluating campaign strategy and while this paper does not focus heavily on the redistricting 
efforts made by political candidates and strategists, it does consider election administrations and 
their work to carry out new and existing laws. Also, Gopian & West’s model of individual 
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district data motivates me to also collect present-day local data in competitive states as part of 
my methodology and research design.  
III. Gerrymandering 
Redistricting is similarly related to the concept of gerrymandering, in which districts are 
drawn with boundaries that intentionally favor one group of voters over others. Engstrom 
discusses this politically-charged topic by deconstructing gerrymandering to its central elements 
of electoral competition and party bias. In his analysis of racial gerrymandering and 
discrimination, Engstrom claims that because minorities largely identify as Democratic voters, 
courts have “allowed for the continued use of implicit racial gerrymandering. Nevertheless, the 
decisions of the more conservative Supreme Court of the 1990s have further reduced the scope 
for race to be a dominant factor in designing districts.”23 In fact, such racial gerrymandering was 
“a dominant factor” in Texas in 2017, according to Adam Liptak of The New York Times, who 
reports that “a three-judge panel of the Federal District Court in San Antonio had ruled that a 
congressional district including Corpus Christi denied Hispanic voters ‘their opportunity to elect 
a candidate of their choice.’”24 The gerrymandered drawing of Texas’ second congressional 
district was contingent on race,25 as Liptak adds clear evidence to Engstrom’s point of race being 
a political motivator in the formation of these gerrymandered districts. In fact, I find that 
Engstrom’s paper and Lipktak’s article create a more nuanced perspective on this topic by 
adding components of racial motivations, which adds demographic elements to the work started 
by Gopian & West and Abramowitz et al. This topic is pivotal in the discussion of the racial and 
political dynamics behind redistricting because of how political motivations may impact 
minority turnout in this process. Gerrymandering, and redistricting more generally, provide 
context of individual state legislatures making certain decisions in response to turnout 
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differences. I can attribute a similar theme of political decision-making to my hypothesis by 
considering how voter ID laws influenced constituents in a variety of politically diverse states.  
IV. Limits in Early Voting and Ballot Access 
 In addition to changes in the organization of districts, there have also have been notable 
developments in ballot access and early voting since the 2000 election. In “The Complicated 
Partisan Effects of State Election Laws,” Burden et al. use county-level voting data from the 
2004, 2008, and 2012 presidential elections to examine how voting laws affect the cost of 
participation in elections.26 Specifically, Burden et al. pay attention to early voting returns and 
changes in registration laws by using cross-sectional regression and difference-in-difference 
models.27 After showing the baseline results of their regression models, these authors “examine 
the effects of lengthening the early voting and [Same Day Voting] periods, then account for the 
density of early voting locations, and finally estimate more stringent difference-in-difference 
models.”28 Among their key results, these authors find that early voting has a negative effect on 
Democratic voters in the three elections between 2004 and 2012.29 Burden et al. heavily assist 
my hypothesis and research design because of their skillful methodology. This paper aims to 
build off their existing work by exploring a relationship with voter turnout and other 
demographic control variables by adopting the author’s regression model set up, while at the 
same time incorporating my own unique data. 
 Using data from the 1992 Current Population Survey (CPS), Oliver examines similar 
voter turnout components as the ones found in Burden et al. by hypothesizing that absentee 
eligibility reduces the costs of voting.30 Oliver examines state party activity and cites the 
intriguing change in eligibility requirements for voting absentee, with over 7% of Americans 
having voted in the 1992 election via absentee ballots.31 However, Oliver’s findings suggest that 
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“liberalized state absentee requirements do not uniformly correlate with an increased likelihood 
of voting absentee; rather absentee voting is partially dependent upon the involvement of 
political mobilizers,”32 thereby suggesting that other factors may be at work here. Oliver even 
affirms that “people in states with expanded eligibility and closed primaries are 4.2% more likely 
to vote absentee while their counterparts in states with universal eligibility are 3.2% more likely 
to mail in their ballots.”33 Ultimately, Oliver concludes that absentee voting rates are a result of 
other influences and that broader eligibility for absentee requirements are increased with party 
mobilization efforts, which challenges Burden et al.’s connection of new voting requirements 
directly influencing turnout. Although I narrow my focus to the subject of voter ID laws, I am 
now better informed about these new absentee voting requirements affecting the voting process.  
Patterson & Caldeira also add to Oliver’s assessment of absentee voting by correlating 
the absentee voting rate at the county-level to the consequences of the absentee voting system for 
the 1982 California gubernatorial elections.34 And while they do not take party mobilization into 
account, they do examine the effect of California’s legislature adopting a new law on absentee 
voting that “abandoned restrictions limiting eligibility to those too ill to go to the polling stations, 
or to those who would be traveling on election day.” 35 As a result of this change, the Republican 
candidate George Deukmejian won the 1978 California gubernatorial race. Patterson & 
Calderia’s article also contrasts with Oliver in timing, as these authors set their focus on legal 
changes resulting from state legislatures and their actions in the 1980s, compared to Oliver who 
observed changes in the 1990s. While these authors offer a worthwhile contribution to my 
understanding of the limitations of absentee voting access, I am determined to discover the 
impacts of voter ID laws on the electorate and, much like Patterson and Calderia’s method, I 
intend to observe what kind of impact it had on voter turnout. 
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V. Campaign Finance and Special Interests 
Much like Shelby County v. Holder, another U.S. Supreme Court decision has reshaped 
the American electoral system, namely Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (FEC). 
According to the Brennan Center for Justice, the Citizens United ruling stuck down a law 
preventing corporations and wealthy interests from contributing to federal politics and allowed 
outside sources to spend unlimited money on elections.36 The Brennan Center added that this 
ruling “dramatically expand[ed] the already outsized political influence of wealthy donors, 
corporations, and special interest groups.”37 Congleton captures the Brennan Center’s point by 
examining how special interest groups affect political outcomes through the specific lens of 
single-issue voting, referring to the kind of behavior exhibited in voters who base their votes on 
one particular issue.38 Congleton examines the several implications surrounding single-issue 
voting and special and economic interests and finds that coordinated interested groups become a 
major factor in influencing political outcomes. He concludes that special interest groups 
substantially influence electoral politics, even with fewer resources.39 In terms of Congleton’s 
relevance to my paper, his article assists my understanding of the economic and special interests 
behind elections and campaigns. Congleton’s article is also useful in pointing out how a change 
in the law, as deliberated by the Supreme Court, affects the voting behavior and participation of 
the electorate, which is a theme I investigate in this paper.  
 This discussion about financial influence in the political and electoral system is further 
unfolded in Briffault’s explanation of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) of 2002. 
The BCRA intended to regulate the financial contributions of political campaigns by primarily 
limiting soft money, or money raised in large sums by political parties for the purpose of 
strengthening party activity.40 Briffault argues that the BCRA, while well intentioned, “fails to 
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address the fundamental problem with campaign finance system,” such as the disclosure of 
campaign expenditures, limitations on contributions, and the public funding of candidates.41 
Briffault mentions that other wealthy interests are at work to contribute unlimited sums of money 
to campaigns to circumvent this law and offers solutions on what reforms need to take place. 
Even though I found this article to be enlightening in the area of campaign finance, I thought this 
article skirted around the significance of the BCRA itself, which ultimately did not place a major 
amount of historical emphasis on how much money influences our political system through the 
use of campaign laws. In fact, according to the Federal Election Commission, about $1.7 billion 
were spent in the 2017/2018 election cycle alone.42 While campaign finance concerns do not 
directly apply to the goals of my paper, Briffault still provides helpful insight into the financial 
mechanisms influencing the voting system, which is expanded on by Congleton’s explanation of 
the ever-controversial Citizen’s United decision.  
VI. Role of Election Officials and Administrations 
Election officials and election administrations are critical organizations who are 
responsible for distributing resources and managing elections at the state, local, and county level. 
Hale et al. examined how public administrations and networks were able to conduct elections 
following the passage of the HAVA. Hale et al. focused on how these organizations’ practices 
coincided with the “organizational performance” of the regions and districts they are overseeing 
and how this performance may be helping or hindering the community.43 In their article, Hale et 
al. consider these local and governmental efforts and assert that “today's intergovernmental 
environment of decentralized and diffuse responsibility, the high public attention since 2000, and 
the additional complications of new requirements under HAVA might suggest that the election 
administration is in need of wholesale overhaul.”44 Hale et al.’s assessment continues about how 
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current election administrations have been influenced by major themes such as political 
incentives and financial difficulties, which influences their effectiveness. I believe that Hale et 
al.’s assessment of local election administrations offers substantial context for this paper by 
providing a more holistic overview of how election administrations hold a great deal of 
responsibility in executing elections. In fact, Hale et al.’s analysis strengthens my own 
understanding of these networks and provides helpful information that will guide my reasoning 
behind my models’ results later in this study. 
Montjoy supplements Hale et al.’s analysis with a focus on the complex network of 
administration actors and how they shape elections. Specifically, Montjoy assesses how the U.S. 
Election Assistance Commission and state CEOs use their new rule-making authority in the 
intergovernmental relations of election administrations.45 As a result of these changes, 51% of 
election administrations have reported recruiting problems and administrations at the federal and 
state level have struggled to train and recruit poll workers, as well as secure spaces for voting 
stations.46 Clearly, Monjoy shines a lot on election administrations lacking resources and staffing 
capability, which in turn enhances this subject compared to Hale et al. These authors provide 
useful information election administrations and their limits, which motivates me to consider how 
the actions of individual players and actors are carried out across county elections at the local 
level. In other words, I will engage with the literature on election administrations and how they 
relate to the application of voter ID laws in the observed states later in my analysis.  
VII. Voting Technology 
 According to Alters & Kooreman, the technologies used to record and count ballots 
varies from county to county across the country in presidential, gubernatorial, and senatorial 
races.47 Alters & Kooreman’s paper takes a comparative approach by comparing American 
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voting machines to the technological processes of the Netherlands.48 In their review of the 2000 
and 2004 presidential elections the United States, Alters & Kooreman find that new innovations 
in touch screen voting have had a “negative effect on voter turnout, and a small but statistically 
significant positive effect on electoral support for George Bush.”49 Alvarez links this technology 
to the criteria of party identification, education, employment status, and type of technology to 
assess voting confidence, which reinforces Alters & Kooreman’s findings in his article.50 
Alvarez finds significance in the relationship between technology and voter confidence, as 
“white voters who cast their ballot via a paper precinct technology being more likely to be 
confident than white voters who cast their ballot via punchcard, lever, or electronic precinct 
voting technologies.”51 Whether it is by punch card or touch screen, both Alvarez and Alters & 
Kooreman associate new voting technology to political participation difficulties. Given that these 
authors concentrate on data trends at the county level, it will be worth mentioning how 
technology played a role in voter turnout later in my analyses with a voter ID law in place. 
 
VIII. Race and Criminal Conviction Laws 
 Larger changes in the voting system are shaped with racial bias, at least according to 
Bentele & O’Brien, who believe that reforms to state voting laws are “highly partisan, strategic, 
and racialized.”52 Bentele & O’Brien use an empirical approach to study Republican Party 
control and minority turnout in the 2000, 2004, and 2008 presidential elections and the 
legislation passed between 2006 and 2011 for any patterns that suggest a certain political 
leaning.53 Ultimately, they find that between 2006 and 2011, “states that increased their share of 
Republican legislators, elected a Republican governor, or became more competitive in the 
electoral college in the presence of a Republican majority in the state house were more likely to 
pass restrictive voter legislation.”54 As a result of this pattern of restrictive voter requirements, 1 
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in 13 black men were ineligible to vote in 2010 and felon disenfranchisement laws directly 
impacted African Americans and their voting capacity at that time. Even though I believe that 
Bentele & O’Brien should have gone further in exploring the gender distinctions among 
minorities and their behavior, I do support Bentele & O’Brien’s notion of the Republican Party 
passing suppressive voter laws at high rates, which I assume is connected to lower voter turnout. 
Another clear example of race causing biased changes to voting can be found in Florida 
shortening the early voting period from 14 days to 8 days in 2012. Herron & Smith observed 
these changes made from the voting patterns among racial minorities and registered Democrats 
in 2008 to 2012 in this state.55 According to the lists of registered voters from Florida’s 
Department of State, African Americans consisted of about 20% of all early voters for all of 
Florida’s early voting days, with Democrats making up a large part of the early voting 
electorate.56 These authors claim that their early voting comparison reveals that “racial and 
ethnic minorities as well as Democrats and unaffiliated voters were far disproportionately less 
likely to vote early in 2012 than in 2008” 57 as a result of the early voting days being reduced in 
Florida. Herron & Smith’s observations add to this catalogue of literature by providing more 
information on the effects of technology changes, which all enlightens me on the kinds of 
strategies that have been put in place to lower minority and Democratic turnout in competitive 
states. Unlike Bentele & O’Brien’s evaluation of legislation passed during 2006 and 2011, these 
authors find that the mere change in early voting requirements disproportionately impacted 
minority and likely Democratic voters, which I find to be more fascinating and relevant to this 
paper. Therefore, examining these precedents provides a better foundation to learn how measures 
in states like Florida persist and even suppress minority turnout today. 
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In 2018, Floridians voted to reinstate the voting rights of over 1 million former felons.58 
While this is an achievement for voting rights and equality, Miles emphasizes how the existing 
phenomenon of felon disenfranchisement impacts voter turnout at the state-level, which lends 
insight as to how these laws operated before Florida’s 2018 reform.59 Miles’ paper uses a 
“difference-in-difference-in-difference” model to compare state-level voter turnout rates on the 
categories of race, gender, and the presence of a law permanently disenfranchising ex-felons, 
using the U.S. Census as his chief data source.60 Miles compares races and genders to each other, 
finding that compared to other groups “average turnout rates of African-American men in states 
where felony convictions disenfranchise them at the most disproportionate rates are no different 
than their average turnout rates in other states,”61 signifying a lack of statistical significance. 
However, when comparing African Americans to white men, the author finds that “the difference 
in voter turnout between states with the most disproportionate disenfranchisement rate and other 
states is about 2.5 percentage points.”62 Based off of this evidence, the author concludes that the 
laws that cause voter disenfranchisement have no impact on voter turnout in states where the law 
exists.63 I believe that Miles misses the mark by not effectively connecting the felon 
disenfranchisement law to election outcomes and if the outcome favors one political party over 
another. This could have been corrected if this author controlled for legislatures passing these 
laws and what political party was in control of government at that time. Furthermore, Bentele & 
O’Brien and Herron & Smith present more compelling evidence using county-level data of felon 
disenfranchisement that observes more direct localized impacts of these laws. Because this 
literature examines state laws’ effect on certain voting groups, I plan to analyze states like 
Florida, Virginia, and Iowa, all of whom enacted strict criminal conviction laws in their recent 
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history, and endeavor to prove how voter ID laws impact election outcomes that favor one 
political party over minority voters. 
IX. Voter Identification Laws 
This paper concentrates primarily on how voter ID laws impact voter turnout in 
historically competitive states. In my preliminary prediction, I claim that voter ID laws have a 
negative effect on certain categories of voters, as the groups I study tend to vote for the 
Democratic party and are therefore targeted by these laws. As a result, if my theory is proven 
correct, Republican candidates win more elections over Democrats in competitive districts 
because of these voter ID laws. Baretto et al. emphasize this point in their article analyzing the 
impact voter ID laws have on the Indianan electorate in 2012. From the onset, Baretto et al. 
believe that voter ID laws already threaten Indiana voters, specifically low-income voters and the 
18% of Indianan adults who do not have a high school diploma.64 These authors then conduct a 
statewide telephone survey where about 1,000 interviews were collected among the pool of 
registered voters. As part of their methodology, Baretto et al. aimed to get a diverse sample of 
the population, so they specifically took oversamples of African-Americans, given that this 
minority representation in the Indianan electorate is small.65 These authors used a chi-square test 
to evaluate the different rates of access to proper photo-ID among voters in Indiana, ultimately 
finding that voter ID laws significantly lower “the opportunity to vote for minority, low-income, 
less-educated, and the youngest and oldest residents of Indiana from the survey, who also tend to 
be correlated with Democratic partisanship.”66 In fact, Baretto et al. find that about 81% of 
eligible white voters had access to valid photo identification, compared to only 55% of eligible 
black voters, a difference of nearly 30%. In other words, Barretto et al. provide evidence to my 
prediction of minority, low-income, and registered Democrats being discriminated against by 
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voter ID laws. This paper will, however, differentiate from the findings and focus of Baretto et 
al.’s paper by focusing more on the local county level in regards to data collection and expanding 
the region of observation to multiple states across the country and not only Indiana. By 
expanding the sample, my analysis can lend more awareness to the inner workings of elections 
and in turn larger strategies of implementing these voter ID laws. 
While it seems that voter ID laws produce limitations to voter turnout because of a lack 
of proper ID, Baretto et al. propose the following question: do voter ID laws deter voters from 
actually going to the polls at all? Erikson et al. attempts to answer this question by evaluating 
statistical arguments and finding a negative effect voter ID laws have on voter turnout.67 Erikson 
and his colleagues used the CPS to measure the voter participation rate of over 64,000 registered 
voters of varying levels of education.68 After conducting a difference-in-difference test from 
these registrants, these authors observe change in legislation, which has as “close to a zero 
‘effect’ as possible for the college educated,” given that they assume that the college educated 
are not as likely to be deterred from voting because of these laws. Comparably, registrants who 
do not have a college education do not experience changes that are statistically significant.69 By 
focusing solely on college-educated registered voters from all over the country, Erikson et al. 
present findings that motivate me to investigate more into certain education categories. That 
being said, I would have wanted to see Erikson et al. adopt Baretto et al.’s approach of 
additionally examining the partisan implications surrounding college-educated voters and their 
behavior. The education approach Baretto et al. take influences my paper, as I aim to include a 
lower education attainment variable as one of the variables for my regression models and see 
how a control of voter ID laws impacts this group and this turnout.  
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Hanjal et al.’s study focuses on the most obstructive version of voter ID laws, which are 
labelled “strict,” as they seek to develop new approaches in examining voter ID law data in their 
own paper.70 Hanjal et al. examine data on individual voter turnout from 2006 to 2014 using the 
Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) and specifically observing trends and pattern 
shifts in party identification, race, and political ideology during this time.71 After running their 
logistic regression model, these authors find “a substantial increase in the gap between white and 
nonwhite turnout in strict voter ID states,” with Latinos, for example, voting less because of 
voter ID laws by a factor of about 7.3 percentage points in general elections.72 Hanjal et al., 
however, do not definitively rest on a single conclusion, as they state that “it is extraordinarily 
difficult when focusing on one or two states in one particular year to be confident that other 
changes in the state were not responsible for changes in turnout”73. I will take Hanjal et al.’s note 
under serious consideration as it does raise the possibility of other spurious variables impacting 
voter turnout in close elections, which will be deliberated in this paper. I am also drawn to 
Hanjal et al.’s piece because it takes into account multiple variables when considering voter ID 
laws, which extends beyond Baretto et al. and Erikson et al.’s work. That being said, Hanjal et 
al., Baretto et al., and Erikson’s articles help better piece together a more detailed understanding 
of how voter ID laws impact voter turnout and, moreover, how empirical analysis is needed to 
draw conclusions on multiple variables during a recent series of elections where this 
phenomenon is at work, which I aim to accomplish through my research. 
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X. Types of Voter Identification Laws 
 In this section, I will outline the main differences among the various types of voter ID 
laws by detailing the different requirements for each kind of law. Voter-identification laws are 
separated into two categories: “photo” and “non-photo,” according to the NCSL:  
 
Some states request or require voters to show an identification document that has a photo on it, 
such as a driver’s license, state-issued identification card, military ID, tribal ID, and many other 
forms of ID. Other states accept non-photo identification such as a bank statement with name and 
address or other document that does not necessarily have a photo.74 
 
 
Some states place more mandatory provisions and requirements on their voters than 
others, like Georgia, Indiana, Virginia, and Wisconsin, who all possess “strict photo-
identification” laws. These laws, according to the NCSL, indicate that “voters without acceptable 
identification must vote on a provisional ballot and also take additional steps after Election Day 
for it to be counted.”75 While these state laws all have their individual differences, they all 
require voters to present the same kinds of government-issued IDs at the polls. In Virginia, for 
example, poll station managers may ask a Virginia citizen to present a U.S. passport, valid 
Virginia license, DMV-issued Veteran’s ID card, student ID card, or any other identification card 
issued by a government agency in Virginia.76 In terms of the penalties for not complying with the 
provisions of these strict photo-ID laws, one can be turned away from the polls entirely. In 
addition, the law states that “any voter who does not show one of the forms of identification 
specified in this subsection shall be offered a provisional ballot marked ID-ONLY that requires 
no follow-up action by the registrar or electoral board” and this must be submitted via mail ahead 
of the election.77 Similarly, Wisconsin’s strict voter-ID law offers the same penalty, with a 
specific clause that states that anyone who votes using a provisional ballot “may furnish statutory 
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ID to the election inspectors before the polls close or to the municipal clerk no later than 4pm on 
the Friday following Election Day.”78 In a similar way, Georgia’s law does not consider a 
student-ID to be a valid form of identification for voting, but “an ID card can be issued at any 
county registrar's office or Department of Driver Services Office free of charge.”79 With these 
different provisions and deadlines established, I assume that voting in these states would be 
difficult to navigate than states without voter ID requirements. 
 Non-strict photo-ID laws differ from strict photo-ID laws because they allow “at least 
some voters without acceptable identification [the] option to cast a ballot that will be counted 
without further action on the part of the voter,” which applies in states like Florida, North 
Carolina, and Rhode Island.80 For instance, if voters do not present a valid form of identification 
when voting, they may be asked to sign an affidavit to confirm their identity or vote by a 
provisional ballot. In Florida, for instance, if an elector is asked to vote via provisional ballot, 
then the canvassing board would determine the ballot’s validity by specifically considering 
whether “the elector is entitled to vote at the precinct where the ballot was cast and that the 
elector had not already cast a ballot in the election.”81 This state’s process is usually conducted 
by comparing the signature on the provisional ballot envelope with the signature in the voter 
registration records.82 Other states like North Carolina designate their review policies to their 
county board of elections for electors who do not possess proper identification and instead send 
in a series of forms to the state.83 Because these forms are managed by government agencies, it is 
reasonable to assume that they may not approve of every elector by the time of the election, 
which undermines their ability to vote. Not to mention that the very existence of these photo-ID 
laws may deter voters who are unable to comply with their state’s local laws and are therefore 
unable to turn out to the polls. 
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XI. Conclusion 
 This paper has reviewed literature surrounding the topic of voting and the dynamics of 
the election system that contribute to the suppression of voter turnout in states across the U.S. 
These dynamics were best demonstrated by the politically biased organization of voting districts 
caused by the redistricting and gerrymandering of these areas, as well as the limits in the early 
voting process and the changes in campaign finance laws that favor special interests. I also 
explored the role of election administrations and their management of their region’s elections, 
the introduction of new voting technologies, how race and criminal status play a factor in who 
votes. Although the literature suggests a wide variety of subject areas that are responsible for low 
voter turnout among certain groups, this paper has remained consistent and determined in its 
focus of voter-ID laws being a major factor in the lowering of voter turnout in certain politically 
competitive states. While much of the literature agrees that Republican-controlled states craft 
voter ID laws to suppress the turnout of minorities and other Democratically-affiliated groups, 
this paper intends to build off that operating suggestion by focusing on how voter ID laws 
between 2014 and 2018 impacted the turnout of voters, which uniquely take place during an 
increasingly polarized political climate that coincided with the transition between two presidents. 
By examining these voter ID laws, I intend to provide evidence of how these laws are 
discriminatory by design and how their existence lowers the turnout of a specified groups of 
voters. 
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Data & Methodology 
 In my research, I analyze the impact voter ID laws had on voter turnout in the 2014, 
2016, and 2018 elections. I concentrate on 19 states, specifically 7 states that implemented a 
voter ID law within the 2014 - 2018 timeframe of this study (Iowa, Kansas, New Hampshire, 
Rhode Island, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin), 6 states whose voter ID laws were 
implemented before 2014 (Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, North Carolina, and Ohio), and, 
as a means of comparison, 6 states that have not implemented a voter ID law whatsoever (Maine, 
Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, Oregon, and Pennsylvania). These 19 states were categorized in 
this way to ensure a variety of comparisons and differences in the regression models. Of these 19 
states, the ten most populous counties were selected to guarantee a high level of representation of 
the people residing in the state, all of which totaled to 185 counties observed and tested. I made 
this choice for my study due to timing constraints because each state differs in terms of their total 
population and number of counties. Furthermore, I encountered accessibility issues in collecting 
county-level turnout data, which led me to make this time-efficient decision for my research 
design. In doing this, these ten most populated counties will be representative of the state’s 
population totals. 
The selection process for choosing these states included looking at the history of their 
implementation of voter ID and election laws, whether they had requirements for voter ID laws, 
and if these laws were established prior to one of the elections in the allotted timeframe. Another 
factor I considered was the states’ background of hosting competitive elections; a state was 
considered for the regression models if the state had a history of competition between Democrats 
and Republicans because voter turnout is expected to be high in those situations.1 The prospect 
of high voter turnout in these 19 states is important because it creates the likelihood of a diverse 
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and representative electorate from a large population sample.2 For this reason, I avoid choosing 
states like New York, California, and Texas, who all have high concentrations of liberal-leaning 
voters in urban areas. The reason for this decision stemmed from the idea that metropolitan and 
urban areas would outperform rural communities in liberal voter turnout,3 which I worried would 
create an unrepresentative and skewed sample. On the other hand, I did incorporate states like 
Florida, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania in this study, which all contain metropolitan centers with 
large liberal voting bases. However, these states produced politically competitive races in recent 
elections, regardless of their urban center’s voting presence. Therefore, choosing the ten most 
populous counties in each state should produce a proportional and fair representation of the state 
as a whole.  
 Moreover, two sources were used for the specific data in my research. The first, in terms 
of demographic information, was pulled from the Current Population Survey (CPS), affiliated 
with the United States Census Bureau. The CPS provided raw state-level demographic statistics, 
specifically on the total number of people in demographic categories based on the state they 
resided in. These broad categories include gender, race, age, education-level attainment, 
unemployment status, and median household income. These categories and statistics were 
generated through CPS’ “Data Table Generator,” which allowed me to access demographic 
statistics based on each state that was being examined, rather than the country as a whole. 
Although this is collected state-level demographic information, it would have been more ideal to 
collect county-level demographic information for this paper, which would have matched with the 
county-level voter turnout data. However, most of the state-level data sources do not label their 
voters by age, race, or gender, and therefore, this data is only available at the state-level. 
Secondly, I pulled total county-level turnout and registered voter information from individual 
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Secretary of State’s offices, state election commissions, or county election commissions for each 
of the states being inspected in this paper. These sources would gauge local county-level activity 
and turnout data. All of these local sources had to be evaluated because each state varies in data 
availability, with some turnout data being difficult to locate among some of these sources in the 
archives.   
Much of the modeling for this study is based off of Burden et al.’s 2017 study on 
partisanship and state election laws.4 I followed Burden et al.’s quantitative approach 
and conducted simple multivariate linear regression difference-in-difference tests using an 
ordinary least squares (OLS) model. While I do maintain the structure of Burden’s quantitative 
research design, I do add additional variables controlling for high school education attainment 
and unemployment status, and not controlling for early voting or felons. I also shift my paper 
away from Burden et.al’s focus on the early voting process and solely center my study on voter 
ID laws. First, I create three “Turnout” variables that trace the difference between two elections. 
These variables were created by simply subtracting two of these variables from each other, such 
as the difference in voter turnout between the 2014 election from the 2016 election. The same 
subtraction process was applied to the total county-level registered voters variable. These raw 
county-level values were then converted into percentages which corresponds to Burden et al.’s 
process. These percentages were made by simply dividing total county-level voter turnout by the 
total number of county-levl registered voters and then multiplying the value by 100 to obtain the 
percentage value. Moreover, I applied a similar mathematical approach to the state-level 
demographic control variables by using the number of people within a certain class and dividing 
them by the total number of people in the state and multiple the result by 100. 
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As for the primary independent variable of “Voter ID Law,” it highlights whether or not a 
voter ID law was implemented in the state between any of the three election cycles and was 
branded with a “YES” or “NO” with information provided by the NCSL. If a state was labeled 
with a “YES,” the state enacted a voter ID laws during the allotted election cycle timeframe and 
if a state was labeled with a “NO,” then the state either did not have a voter ID law at all or 
applied the law before the 2014. In situations where a state’s voter ID law was removed, as was 
the case with North Carolina’s voter ID law, then the state would be labelled “NO,” as the law 
was no longer valid by the time of any of the elections being studied.5 From here, the 
independent variable was converted into a dummy variable, coded 0 for states that did not have a 
voter ID law enforced between two election cycles, and coded 1 for states that had a voter ID law 
during these elections.  
After these variables were created, I then concentrated on certain control variables of the 
categories of people that could be at the highest risk of voter disenfranchisement as a result of a 
voter ID law being implemented using the CPS data. These variables included “Hispanic,” 
“Black,” “Female,” “High School Diploma,” “Unemployed,” and “Low Median Household 
Income” for 2016 and 2018. Demographic statistics from 2014 were not considered for these 
regressions, as this approach would contrast Burden et al.’s in measuring differences in their 
regression tests. In regards to the Hispanic and Black categories, I decided to test these particular 
control variables because they were used in Burden et al.’s regressions and were based off 
presumptions that minorities are at a high risk of not voting because of a voter ID law. For 
instance, a 2018 Atlantic article reported on the barriers that limit minority access to the polls, 
finding that Wisconsin enacted “racially biased election laws.”6 Another article, this time from 
the Washington Post, claims that minorities and people of color are at a greater chance of not 
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meeting the requirements to secure a voter ID card, with one Washington federal court adding 
that “the burden of obtaining a state voter-ID certificate would weigh disproportionately on 
minorities.”7 Based off of the literature on this subject and from these two articles, I presume that 
Hispanics and African Americans are at a greater risk of being negatively impacted by voter ID 
laws. Voting trends in recent elections suggest that minorities vote for Democratic candidates at 
higher rates between 2014 and 2018 than Republican candidates. The same could be said for 
female voters, who have voted in higher frequencies and voted for the Democratic candidate 
more compared to male voters during these elections8.  
Another category of people that I examined was adults between the ages of 65 and 74, 
which is an age class I define as “elderly” and that I adopted from Burden et al’s study. Because 
of my interest in understanding the elderly’s voting response in states with a voter ID law, I 
differentiate my model from Burden et al.’s on the basis of age by solely focusing on elderly 
adults and excluding 18-24-year-old adults, or “College Students and Graduates.” While one 
could argue that college graduate turnout is significant because of its rise in turnout over the past 
few election cycles, they have been historically outperformed by adult elders in the 2014 and 
2018 midterm elections. Adding to this point, many voter ID laws include a provision that allows 
college-aged students to use their college-issued and government identification cards to vote in 
states with these laws. Meanwhile, adults between the ages of 65 and 74 are less likely to possess 
a government-issued ID card and are consequently at a greater chance of being directly impacted 
by a voter ID law. I also include a variable that represents the number of adults in these states 
who have only obtained a high school diploma and nothing higher. Moreover, this data, like all 
of the descriptive statistics listed in this section, comes from the CPS’ database, which arranges 
education attainment into four categories, “No Education,” “High School Diploma,” “Some 
Levy 32 
College,” and “Bachelors or Higher.” For the purpose of this study, I only look to high school 
education and compare it to the other forms of education level attainment while controlling for 
voter ID laws.  
Next, I argue the connection between the unemployed and voting turnout can also be 
affected by voter ID laws due to their lack of resources as well and I engage with the literature to 
further understand the context of this possible connection. In 2012, Burden & Wichowsky 
discussed economic voting behavior, and more specifically the voting behavior of the 
unemployed. To test the relationship between the unemployed and voting behavior, these authors 
conduct a difference-in-difference test on Democratic and Republican voters and the 
unemployment rate over time at the state-level. Their findings suggest that the “turnout gap 
between the employed and unemployed shrinks as state unemployment increases. In sum, it 
appears that a sour economic performance, at least in terms of unemployment statistics, 
invigorates rather than suppresses electoral participation.”9 While these results suggest that poor 
economic conditions may increase voter turnout, these authors do not incorporate a control 
variable of a voter ID law, which I intend to include in my models. As a result, I intend to test the 
relationship between voter ID laws and their impact on the unemployed and I theorize that if 
voter ID laws were established during the timeframe of the three elections, then it will have a 
disproportionate and negative impact on the turnout of unemployed voters.  
Lastly, I add the variable of median household income because I believe it adds to my 
existing prediction of adults of a lower socioeconomic status, especially those making between 
$25,000 - $69,999 a year, being negatively impacted by voter ID laws because of their lack of 
resources. The lower bracket of the range for this economic class was taken from the U.S. 
Department of Education, which classifies a family in poverty as making about $25,500 a year, 
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as well as the US Census10. This variable’s upper bracket of $69,999 originated from a Pew 
Research Study that classified 52% of American adults that they studied at around $70,000 as 
part of low median household income.11 I also label and classify the other median household 
income variables with numerical upper and lower brackets. Specifically, those who made 
between “$25,000 - $69,000” were classified as “Low Median Household Income,” those who 
made between “$70,000 - $99,999” were considered “Middle Median Household Income,” and 
those who earned “$100,000+” were classified as “High Median Household Income.” Given 
these economic considerations, I intend to test this variable to understand voter turnout 
differences among those of a lower median household income compared to those of a higher 
median household income status. For the variables linked to economic disadvantage, I decided to 
concentrate these three variables of a lower socioeconomic status: “High School Diploma,” the 
“Unemployed,” and “Low Median Household Income.” I assume that members of a lower 
socioeconomic class and education level were present in the elections studied in my research. I 
predict that these three variables are all linked to economic adversity and that a voter ID law will 
negatively impact their turnout because of their limited resources as a result their low 
socioeconomic status.12 These economically disadvantaged voters could be less likely to become 
informed on the law’s requirements, which results in members of these groups not obtaining the 
necessary government-approved IDs to legally vote in their state. 
Before I incorporate all of these control variables in my regression models, I first include 
a series of descriptive statistics that highlight the population totals of these variables by state. I 
include figures displaying the total voter turnout rate by state for each of the three elections 
because I believe that in order to fully grasp turnout differences over the span of three election 
cycles, it is important to understand the fluctuations in total voter turnout and other demographic 
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changes for the purpose of visual representation, especially the voting behavior of racial 
minorities, women, the elderly, and those with a lower socioeconomic status. These descriptive 
statistics also highlight a series of variability measures which were calculated using the values in 
the dataset. Likewise, given that there were turnout percentage differences during this timeframe, 
a scaling function was applied to all of these variables to standardize them properly, which 
should also remove any concern of multicollinearity when these variables are used. 
In my first model, I test the turnout difference between the 2016 election and the 2014 
election while controlling for voter ID laws and the demographic variables. These two elections 
did see a massive turnout disparity, with the 2016 presidential election seeing a voter turnout rate 
of about 58%.13 At the same time, the race consisted of two polarizing candidates of both parties 
and Barack Obama was President at the time of both elections. This is relevant because during 
both elections, President Obama became the target of many Republicans in their own bid to seek 
higher office. Thus, these possible spurious factors interfering with the regression observation 
will be assessed for their conceivable impact on my research after the tests are conducted. A 
similar point can be assumed in the second model of comparing the difference of the 2016 
presidential election to the 2018 midterms, which also demonstrates unique differences in voter 
turnout, political polarization, and voter mobilization efforts. However, the third model may 
correct these possible underlying issues by comparing the 2014 and 2018 midterms, which both 
are in the same non-presidential election years. These midterms should also be significant 
because of the elections taking place under the administrations of two presidents from two 
different political parties, President Obama and President Trump. In sum, I expect to find 
statistically significant and negative results for my turnout dependent variable while controlling 
for demographic variables and voter ID laws. 
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Results 
 Figure 1 presents a map of the United States and reports the 19 states being observed in 
this study and organizes them into 3 categories: “States without a Voter ID Law,” “States with a 
Voter ID Law (before 2014),” “States with a Voter ID Law (between 2014 – 2018).” A color-
coded scheme was used to differentiate these three categories, as indicated by Figure 1’s legend. 
According to this figure, the chosen states for this study, especially the ones with a voter ID law, 
are in fact in various regions of the country, from New England to the Midwest to the Southwest. 
Most of the states without a voter ID law have a mix of Democratic and Republican voters and 
are diversified with both urban and rural population centers. All of the states with a voter ID law 
have seen competitive races between the two major parties or have had Republicans holding a 
significant number of state and federal level positions in government between 2014 and 2018. 
Just on population statistics alone, 38.03% of all Americans are represented in these 19 states. 
Figure 1. States and Voter ID Laws 
 
Source. National Conference of State Legislatures1 
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Figure 2. Voter Turnout By State, 2014
 
Figure 2 is represented by a box plot and reports the turnout rates by state in 2014. In 
terms of the states with the lowest turnout in this election, it appears that Indiana has the lowest 
turnout rate at less than 30%. Judging by the position of New Jersey’s median, it appears to be 
the second to last state in terms of voter turnout, at around 35% and it also appears to be 
positively skewed toward the lower values. On the other side, both Oregon and Wisconsin report 
relatively high levels of turnout near 70%. In terms for the 19 states as a whole, the mean 
average turnout for Figure 2 is 49.39%. Some states like Nevada and Arizona exhibit extended 
upper and lower hinges in their box, which represents the connection of the minimum and 
maximum values and fall within 1.5 times the quartile range. It should not come as a surprise 
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that Figure 2 has a high variability due to its data points being so spread out across the graph, 
with a variance of 139.24 with a standard deviation of 11.8 that departs from the mean. 
Figure 3. Voter Turnout By State, 2016
 
 Figure 3 reports a similar box plot that accounts for the voter turnout percentages by state 
in 2016. The median of this figure is 71.7 with a mean of 71.34, which shows how similar the 
voting patterns were across these states. Strikingly, Georgia has a median at 78%, but also has 
the largest lower quartile that almost extends beyond 60%, which indicates the voter turnout 
below which 25% of these cases fall. On the other hand, Virginia appears to have a noticeably 
high upper quartile that exceeds an 80% turnout rate, showing that 75% of the cases fall within 
that range. These features make both Virginia and Georgia have intriguing and wide interquartile 
ranges. Another interesting data point reported in Figure 3 is the lowest outlier in the box plot for 
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Maine, which represents one of the state’s counties with a noticeably low turnout around 40%. 
This outlier reflects the state’s overall low population totals and large rural areas. Meanwhile, 
Florida appears to have a higher outlier value above 90%. Both of these points show how they 
are several times above the upper quartile of their respective boxes. Nevada’s upper hinge 
extends to over 90% and also appears to be skewed positively. Overall, Nevada, Iowa, Virginia 
and Wisconsin all have the highest turnout rates, while Indiana and West Virginia have the 
lowest rates. Compared to Figure 2, this distribution’s variance is lower at 81.86, but still 
indicates the spread-out variability with a 9.05 standard deviation for the mean. 
 
Figure 4. Voter Turnout By State, 2018 
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Figure 4 reports turnout rates for the 2018 midterm election, as represented by a box plot 
like in Figures 2 and 3. Wisconsin appears to have a comparably high turnout rate than the other 
states with a median point at around 80%. Meanwhile, West Virginia and Indiana have relatively 
similar medians just below 50%. Although, Indiana’s upper quartile reaches above 50%, 
showing again the value below which 75% of the cases fall, in which median is closer to the 
lower quartile. Some outliers are present in this figure, with Virginia displaying a low turnout 
outlier for one of its counties at 30%. Regarding the box plot graph as a whole, the y-axis 
dependent variable of voter turnout in the 2018 election has a mean value of 59.73 and a median 
of 58.79, which both show again how relatively similar these two values are to each other. Figure 
3 reports a slightly higher variance than Figure 2 at 84.11, but it still is lower compared to 2014. 
Nevertheless, this high variability is matched with a standard deviation from the mean of 9.17. 
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Figure 5. Average Hispanic Adult Totals By State, 2016-2018 
 
Figure 5 and Figure 6 report percentage population totals by state during the 2016 and 
2018 elections for Hispanic and African Americans respectively. The data of Hispanic turnout in 
Figure 5 reports a bar chart distribution of the average number of Hispanic adults in the 19 
observed states between 2016 and 2018. The bars represented in this figure, as well as the 
following figures of the descriptive demographic statistics, align with the average percentage of 
Hispanic population totals between these two election years. Among these 19 states, three states 
appear to have a predominant share of the nation’s Hispanic adults: Arizona (37%), Nevada 
(28%), and Florida (27%). These three states have historically had large concentrations of 
Hispanic adults in their overall population, as these three states are also in the top 10 states in the 
country with the highest percentage of Hispanic adults.2 Comparably, Maine, New Hampshire, 
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and West Virginia have small numbers of Hispanics in their overall population, both with below 
5% Hispanic makeup and a disproportionate number of adults of other races at over 90%. The 
pattern implies that a high percentage of Hispanic adults reside in Western states and states with 
large urban concentrations. The y-axis variable of the average number of Hispanic adults 
produced a very high variance of 88.84, indicating an unsurprisingly heterogeneous collection of 
data points for Hispanic adults. In terms of the measure of variability for this group, the variable 
holds a standard deviation () of 9.43, which is a helpful point in understanding the placement of 
one point in the whole distribution and how it departs from the mean of 12.53. While this graph 
does not appear to have a particular shape, the majority of percentages in the states are lower and 
do appear to be positively skewed. 
 
Figure 6. Average African American Adults Totals By State, 2016-2018
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Similar to Figure 5, Figure 6 reports a bar chart distribution of the average percentage of 
African American adults residing in the 19 observed states within the same timeframe of 2016 
and 2018. One of the most interesting findings comes from the state of Georgia, which has the 
highest percentage of African Americans, reaching about a 33% total percentage rate during 
these elections. North Carolina (23%), Virginia (21%), and Florida (18%) follow closely after 
Georgia with relatively high average percentages of African American adults. The high 
percentages of these four Southern states are not surprising, as they also reflect existing African 
American population statistics during this time period, according to the Office of Minority 
Health at the US Department of Health and Human Services.3 Conversely, Maine, New 
Hampshire, and Oregon reveal some of the lowest average percentages of African Americans, all 
ranging from about 2 to 3% of their overall population makeup. Interestingly, these states, as 
well as states like Iowa and West Virginia, all contain overall low numbers of minority 
populations.  This pattern also points to the fact that while all five of these states are not 
concentrated in one particular region of the country, they do encompass large swaths of rural 
land with overall low population counts. Correspondingly, states that house large concentrations 
of African Americans are more urbanized and densely populated with higher population totals. 
Furthermore, the variance of the y-axis variable of average African American totals is lower 
compared to the variance of the Figure 5 dependent variable, but still remains relatively high at 
66.08. This high variance not only indicates a mixed collection of data, but it also shows how the 
data points in Figure 6 are more spread out from the mean of 11.35. Figure 6’s distribution also 
reports a standard deviation () of 8.13, also highlighting the average deviations from the mean 
in a distribution whose values also skew in a positive direction. With variability differences 
between these two racial demographic graphs, it’s clear that Figure 6 has a high degree of 
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variability because of its higher variance. Nevertheless, both Figure 5 and Figure 6 are useful in 
understanding the racial demographic makeup of the states being studied in this paper. 
Figure 7. Average Female Adult Totals By State, 2016-2018
 
Figure 7 reports the total average distribution of adult women residing in the observed 
states between 2016 and 2018. In terms of the layout of this uniform graph, the y-axis limits 
were expanded in order to clearly point out how closely all of these values reach the 50% mark 
of the population. Most of these states have relatively similar shares of the female population, 
with Florida, Georgia, and North Carolina being slightly more abundant at around 52%. By 
contrast, Iowa, Maine, and Wisconsin have a slightly lower percentage of women compared to 
the Southern states, all at around 50%. The median of this distribution is 51.35 and mean of this 
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distribution is 51.38, showing how close they are to each other and only off by 0.03. It is worth 
reiterating that these differences in percentages are rather slim because this variable encompasses 
more of a state’s total population and is not restricted on the basis of race or any other 
demographic other than sex. Therefore, the very low variance of 0.51 of this nearly homogenous 
distribution coincides with the data points presented in this bar chart falling close to the mean 
and to each other. Likewise, the standard deviation () is 0.72, which with the variance helps 
explain how these data points do not indicate strong variability and do not depart far from the 
figure’s mean. In understanding Figures 5, 6, and 7, it would appear that many of these groups 
reside in the South, which perhaps further emphasizes how many of these citizens reside in states 
with more densely populated and urban centers.  
 
Figure 8. Average Adults - Ages 65-74 By State, 2016-2018 
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Figure 8 produces the results of the average total number of elderly adults between the 
ages of 65-74 between 2016 and 2018. Compared to Figure 7, this graph appears to contain 
values that are more dispersed throughout the country and, unlike the racial demographics in 
Figures 5 and 6, not bound to one particular region. In fact, they appear to be located in various 
states across the country, most notably in Maine (17%), West Virginia (17%), and Florida (16%). 
At the lower end, Georgia, Kansas, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Virginia, and Wisconsin all 
report average percent totals of elderly citizens to be at around 11 to 12%. The variance of the 
dependent variable is 2.98 and the standard deviation is 1.73, which are numbers similarly 
reported in Figure 7, in which the low variance and standard deviation of this variable both 
indicate a relatively homogeneous level of variability across this normal distribution and a 
minimal departure from the mean of 14.37. This is also better explained by this figure’s range of 
12.5% to 18.2 % of the average number of elderly adults. Given the historically high turnout of 
elderly voters, Figure 8 provides critical context for predicting and analyzing voting activity and 
behavior.  
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Figure 9. Average Total Adults with a High School Education, 2016-2018 
 
Figure 9 reports on adults with only a high school level education by state, specifically 
the average number of adults who only attained a high school diploma and nothing higher. Maine 
and West Virginia appear to be states with the highest percentage of citizens in this education 
class among their population, with a respective 28% and 34% high school education population 
total. By contrast, Arizona and Virginia have some of the lowest percentages of adults in this 
education category, both with about a 19% total among them. With a variance of 14.02, Figure 9 
reports a higher degree of variability, especially when the standard deviation is 3.74 units apart 
from the mean of 24.28. Unlike my previous descriptive statistics, it is more difficult to 
generalize the region where most of these citizens reside, as most of people of this group seem 
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do not seem to be bound to any particular region on the country. Moreover, these states differ in 
terms of population density and quantity of urban and rural areas of the state. 
 
Figure 10. Average Total Unemployed Adults by State, 2016-2018 
 
 Next, I turn to Figure 10, which details the results of the average unemployed adults by 
percentage in each state. The graph indicates that between 2016 and 2018, Nevada (3.18%), 
Pennsylvania (3.01%), New Jersey (2.74%), and Ohio (2.73%) possessed the highest number of 
unemployed adults, which are percentages reflected in the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BOLS) 
for 2018.4 On the other side, of this Kansas, New Hampshire, and West Virginia have 
unemployment rates that do not go above 2%. Unsurprisingly, the variability of Figure 10 is 
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relatively homogeneous because of the low variance of 0.14, as the data points are not that far 
from the mean of 2.36 with a standard deviation of 0.37. This is better emphasized by the 
figure’s range of 1.82 to 3.17, showing how small the margins are. Also, with a median of 
2.08%, Figure 10 helps showcase the relatively low rate of unemployment during this time. 
Unemployed adults are not restricted to any certain area and, unlike the other models, are not 
solely located in urbanized regions or politically competitive “swing states.” However, more 
analysis is needed on these states’ overall economic situation to understand the county’s 
economic improvements. 
 
Figure 11. Average Total Low Median Household Income Adults by State, 2016-2018 
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 The last descriptive statistic that I highlight is presented in Figure 11, which reports on 
the total number of low-income residents by state, based on their median household income. The 
data in this bar chart indicates that states encompassing more rural regions have the highest 
number of low-income residents, with Nevada containing the most at an average of 40 % over 
the two election cycles in this normal distribution. Arizona and West Virginia list similar figures 
for their low-income citizens, both hovering around a 39% of low median household income 
adults. On the lower end of this dependent variable, New Hampshire and New Jersey both seem 
to be reporting the lowest numbers of low median household income residents, with an average 
of about 28%. Judging by the closeness of the data points, this graph is reporting a low level of 
variability compared to Figure 10, as this graph presents a variance of 12.44 and a departure 
from the mean of 34.62 with a standard deviation of 3.53. Figure 11, as well as the content in 
Figures 9 and 10, are all intended to provide context for the overall socioeconomic situation in 
the states observed in the dataset used for the regression models. 
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Table 1. The Difference Between the 2014 Midterm Election and the 2016 Presidential Election,  
Difference-In-Difference Test. 
 Coefficient Std. Error T-Value P>z 
Constant 0.0781 0.0711 1.10 0.2733 
Voter ID Law, 2014-2016 -0.3212 0.1760 -1.82 0.0697 
% Hispanic Total 0.0849 0.0914 0.93 0.3540 
% Black Total -0.2341 0.1049 -2.23 0.0269 
% Female Total 0.5872 0.0921 6.37 0.0000 
% Sixty-Five – Seventy-Four -0.3494 0.1093 -3.20 0.0016 
% High School Diploma 0.0218 0.1532 0.14 0.8871 
% Unemployed 0.3606 0.1109 3.25 0.0014 
% Low Median Household Income  -0.2113 0.0748 -2.82 0.0053 
R2 = .44 
N = 185 
Significance Level: 0.05 
    
  
In my Table 1 regression model, I focus on the voter turnout differences between the 
2014 midterm election and 2016 presidential election while controlling for voter ID law 
implementation and other demographic variables. This table represents about a 19.3% difference 
in turnout between the midterm election and the presidential election.5 Based on the high t-values 
that exceed the absolute value of 2 and the low p-values below .05, Table 1 reports statistically 
significant results for black, female, elderly, unemployed, and low median household income 
adult variables. This excludes Hispanic and high school educated adults, whose values do not 
cross the threshold of statistical significance, meaning that it is difficult to determine if an effect 
was preset and thus the null is accepted. In terms of the turnout alpha of .0781, it becomes the 
intercept in this multiple regression when both the control variables of voter ID laws and 
demographic variables are both zero at a confidence level of 95%. The first variable to cross the 
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level of statistical significance was the African American adult control variable. For every one 
unit change of African Americans in the 19 observed states, there was a -0.2341 decrease in the 
level of turnout. The standard error of 0.1049 represents the space between the observed data and 
the line of regression, while the high t-value and low p-value prove that the variable is 
statistically significant when the alpha is 0.05, indicating that the risk of finding a difference was 
low. At this alpha level, I can reject the null of no relationship between the Black population and 
voter turnout and assert that there is a negative relationship present in this effect.  
Among the other statistically significant variables, a similar negative phenomenon can be 
traced with the elderly adult and the low median household income variables. In terms of the 
elderly adult variable, the t-value of -3.20 and p-value of 0.0016 cross the level of statistical 
significance and a one-unit change in elderly voters relates to a -0.3494 decrease in the level of 
voter turnout. With the same reasoning of statistical significance, a one-unit change increase in 
low median household income voters is attributed to a -0.2113 decrease in voter turnout. With 
the alpha at 0.05, I can assert that the null hypothesis of both elderly voters and low median 
household income voters is firmly rejected with a negative relationship to voter turnout. In fact, 
of all of these statistically significant variables, the African American, elderly, and low income 
variables all trend in a negative direction, suggesting a negative effect when controlling for voter 
ID laws as well as the other demographic controls. 
The most notable statistically significant result comes from the female adult variable, 
which reports a high t-value of 6.37 and a low p-value of 0, indicating a positive impact on 
women. To put it another way, a one-unit change in the value of female adults occasions a .5872 
increase in voter turnout, which is more than half a percentage point. In fact, the female 
variable’s coefficient of 0.5872 is the highest compared to the other control variables and 
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suggests that as the mean increases, the value of voter turnout increases. I can claim with 95% 
confidence that the null hypothesis is rejected and that there is a strong positive correlation of 
voter turnout and female adults. In addition to the female adult variable, the variable representing 
unemployed adults also crossed the level of statistical significance and trends in a positive 
direction by a rate of 0.3606. The null of this variable also can be rejected with a significance 
level of 0.05. The voter ID law, Hispanic adult, and high school diploma variable did not cross 
the level of significance. Based on the correlation coefficient (R2), the postulated relationship of 
these variables is explained by 44% of voter turnout variation, so 56% of the random variation in 
voter turnout is thus unexplained by these control variables.   
Table 2. The Difference Between the 2016 Presidential Election and the 2018 Midterm Election,  
Difference-In-Difference Test. 
 Coefficient Std. Error T-Value P>z 
Constant 0.0917 0.0652 1.41 0.1613 
Voter ID Law, 2016-2018 -0.8483 0.2457 -3.45 0.0007 
% Hispanic Total 0.0866 0.0882 0.98 0.3278 
% Black Total 0.0764 0.1080 0.71 0.4801 
% Female Total -0.6955 0.1102 -6.31 2.17e-09 
% Sixty-Five – Seventy-Four 0.2053 0.0967 2.12 0.0352 
% High School Diploma 0.0024 0.0916 0.03 0.9787 
% Unemployed -0.1216 0.0688 -1.77 0.0785 
% Low Median Household Income  0.3673 0.0770 4.77 3.84e-06 
R2 = .3728 
N = 185 
Significance Level: 0.05 
    
 
My second model in Table 2 concerns voter turnout differences in the 2016 presidential 
election and 2018 midterm election, while controlling for the same demographic variables as in 
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Table 1. Much like Table 1, there is a noticeable difference in overall turnout, with an estimated 
14% turnout difference between these two elections. However, Table 2 differs from the outputs 
in Table 1 by reporting statistically significant results for the main voter ID law independent 
variable, as well as the female, elderly, and low median household income variables. The Black, 
Hispanic, high school educated, and unemployed variables did not cross the necessary statistical 
significance threshold in the Table 2 model. With high t-values and p-values, this pattern 
suggests that a statistically significant relationship cannot be affirmed among these four variables 
and, therefore, the null hypothesis is retained. Table 2’s constant of .0917 becomes the intercept 
of this multiple regression when all of the control variables reach 0 at a confidence level of 95%. 
In terms of the statistically significant variables from this regression model, the voter ID 
law variable met the requirements of statistical significance with a -3.453 t-value and a low 
0.0007 p-value. For every one unit change in the value of the voter ID law variable, a -0.8483 
decrease was occasioned for the level of voter turnout. The space between the regression line and 
observed data for this variable is the standard error of 0.2457. With 95% confidence, I can reject 
the null and claim that there is a negative relationship present between the implementation of 
voter ID laws and voter turnout between 2016 and 2018. Much like Table 1, a similarly large 
negative relationship is also apparent in the female adult variable, as it also reports statistical 
significance with a high t-value of -6.312 and a low p-value of 2.17e-09. For this female adult 
variable, a one unit change relates to a -0.6955 decrease for the female control variable, while 
controlling for other demographic variables and voter ID law enactment. Given that these 
numbers trend in a negative direction, I can claim with 95% confidence that the null is rejected 
and that there is a negative relationship in this effect. With this particular variable, the 
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relationship between female adults and voter turnout is explained by 16.59% of the variance. The 
remaining 83.41% could be explained by other racial and demographic factors. 
Furthermore, two other variables reached statistical significance and trended in a positive 
direction: elderly adults and low median household income adults. The elderly adult variable 
reported a t-value that just passes the limit for statistical significance, with a 2.122 t-value, 
accompanied by a 0.0352 p-value. As the average one-unit change increases for elderly voters, 
voter turnout increases too at 0.2052, while controlling for other variables. Similarly, I also see 
that this variable trends in a positive direction because of the low median household income 
variable’s t-value of 4.771 and very small p-value of 3.84e-06. This conclusion can be drawn 
because with every one unit change in the value of this control variable, there is also a 0.3673 
increase in the dependent variable of voter turnout, with a positive relationship associated with 
this effect. Therefore, I claim at the 0.05 significance level that the null hypothesis of no 
relationship is rejected as there is in fact a positive relationship with the turnout of elderly and 
low income adults. Based on the correlation coefficient (R2) of this regression table, the assumed 
relationship of all of these control variables is explained by 37.28% of the variation of voter 
turnout, so 62.72% of the random variation of voter turnout is consequently unexplained by these 
control variables.   
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Table 3. The Difference Between the 2014 Midterm Election and the 2018 Midterm Election,  
Difference-In-Difference Test. 
 Coefficient Std. Error T-Value P>z 
Constant 0.2139 0.0919 2.33 0.0211 
Voter ID Law, 2014-2018 -0.6087 0.1880 -3.24 0.0014 
% Hispanic Total 0.5177 0.0947 5.47 0.0000 
% Black Total 0.2719 0.1190 2.29 0.0235 
% Female Total -0.4497 0.1169 -3.85 0.0002 
% Sixty-Five – Seventy-Four -0.2805 0.1039 -2.70 0.0076 
% High School Diploma 0.4001 0.0963 4.15 0.0001 
% Unemployed -0.1155 0.0801 -1.44 0.1510 
% Low Median Household Income  -0.1246 0.0823 -1.51 0.1319 
R2 = .2637 
N = 185 
Significance Level = 0.05 
    
 
 Lastly, Table 3 reports the data from my third multiple regression model based on the 
difference between two midterm elections in 2014 and 2018. This model contrasts with the 
previous two models because it focuses on two similar elections exactly four years apart while 
controlling for the same demographic variables. Continuing to depart from the previous two 
turnout models, Table 3 reports fairly consistent statistically significant values that impact most 
of the control variables, with the exception of the unemployed and low-income variables. In 
terms of these two variables not crossing the threshold of statistical significance, all have low t-
values and high p-values above the statistically significant threshold of 0.05, respectively at 
0.1510 and 0.1319. This pattern suggests that a significant relationship between voter ID laws 
cannot be affirmed and, therefore, the null hypothesis is unable to be rejected.  
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 Table 3 is the only model to report a statistically significant constant in this regression 
table, with a t-value of 2.33 and a small p-value of 0.0211. The constant value of 0.2139 
represents the expected percentage of voter turnout when the independent variable of voter ID 
laws is equal to 0, for which this value crosses over the y-axis. Not only does the constant appear 
to exhibit a positive effect, but the two racial variables also appear to showcase positive effects. 
The Hispanic variable crosses the threshold of statistical significance at a high 5.47 t-value and a 
low p-value of 0. To put these numbers another way, on average, a one-percent increase in the 
value of Hispanic adults increases the voter turnout dependent variable by more than half a 
percentage point, specifically at 0.5177. The null of this relationship can firmly be rejected with 
at a 0.05 significance level as a positive relationship is implied. Similarly, the African American 
variable also meets the requirements for statistical significance with slightly lower positive t-
values and low p-values. In a similar vein, with a one-unit increase in the value of African 
American adults increases the voter turnout rate by more than a quarter of a percentage point at 
0.2719. With 95% confidence, the null can also be rejected as a positive effect is also found. In 
addition to the racial demographics exhibiting a positive relationship, the high school education 
attainment variable also exhibits a similar positive effect, a one unit change in high school 
diploma attainment with a 0.4001 increase in voter turnout. Adding that the standard error of 
0.0963 represents the space between the observed data and the line of regression, I can state with 
95% confidence that the null is rejected with a positive relationship in effect 
By contrast, several variables crossed the limit of statistical significance while trending in 
a negative direction, such as the independent variable of voter ID law implementation between 
2014 and 2018, which saw a t-value of -3.24 and a low p-value of 0.0014. On average, a one-
percent increase in the voter ID law variable decreases the value of voter turnout by -0.6087, 
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which is enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis because a negative trend is clearly 
indicated. Next, the female and elderly variables both show similar patterns of negative 
outcomes and both meet the requirements for statistical significance. For the female adult 
variable, a decreasing value of -0.4497 is effected with an average unit change of the voter 
turnout variable. This contrasts with the previous two tables, which both reported that the female 
adult variable was trending in a positive direction. However, because of the positive effect on 
this female adult variable and its high t-value and low p-value, the null hypothesis of no 
relationship can indeed be rejected for this variable. Lastly, the elderly adult variable became 
statistically and a unit change in this independent control variable subtracts, on average, -0.2805 
points of dependent variable of voter turnout. Like the other previous variables, the null 
hypothesis can be rejected with 95% confidence as a negative relationship is found here. The null 
can also be rejected for the relationship between the voter ID law variable and voter turnout, as 
this independent control variable is statistically significant and shows a -0.6087 decrease in voter 
turnout for every 1% increase in voter ID laws. According to the correlation coefficient (R2) of 
this multiple regression table, the supposed relationship of all of these control variables is 
explained by 26.37% of the variation of voter turnout, so 73.63% of the random variation of 
voter turnout is consequently unexplained by these control variables.  
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Discussion 
 My results find that voter ID laws produce negative and positive effects on the turnout of 
different voter categories, including minority groups and voters who have been historically 
supportive of the Democratic party. Interestingly, these regression tests produced findings that 
show racial minority groups being particularly impacted by voter ID laws with some of the racial 
variables trending in both positive and negative directions To understand this connection, I turn 
again to the existing findings in the voter ID-related literature, such as Bentele & O’Brien’s 
analysis of race and voter ID laws, where the authors state that “the recent wave of restrictive-
access legislation is rooted in long-standing racial and classist motivations revived for modern 
deployment.”1 In other words, the authors claim that these new laws are motivated by attitudes 
on the basis of race and class today. Bentele & O’Brien also connect criminal 
disenfranchisement laws to the Republican Party and Republican-controlled state legislatures 
between 2006 and 2011 in how they used these “long-standing motivations” to craft legislation 
that hindered these groups’ ability to vote. Another similar observation of these racial voting 
patterns was conducted by Herron & Smith, who after comparing two presidential elections, 
found that racial and ethnic minority voters were less likely to vote early in the 2012 election, 
compared to 2008, due to reforms in the early voting process.2 Although these results deal in a 
subject matter slightly different from the intentions of my models, these authors still find that 
legal changes in the voting process have a disproportionate effect on minorities, which matches 
with my finding of the African American variable trending in a negative direction between 2014 
and 2016 in Table 1 (t = -2.23, p = 0.0269). I believe that these results were appropriately 
produced as a result of using a difference-in-difference regression model to test these 
relationships as part of my methodology. 
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 However, it should also be noted that other scholars would disagree with Bentele & 
O’Brien and Herron & Smith’s observations and argue with my findings. For example, Mycoff et 
al. argue that “voter-ID laws should have little to no effect on aggregate or individual-level 
turnout, particularly after considering political motivations for voting.”3 These authors ran 
bivariate regressions, testing the relationship between individual-level voter turnout and the 
severity of the voter-identification laws implemented between 2000 and 2006. Among their 
various results, Mycoff et al. find that “a two-way random effects analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
comparing mean turnout across election year, voter identification laws, and the interaction 
between the two reveals only the year variable reaching statistical significance.” Ultimately, they 
conclude that by “controlling for the election year, state voter-identification laws produced no 
statistically significant effects on aggregate state-level turnout. This analysis suggests that from 
2000 to 2006, state-level aggregate turnout and voter-ID requirements were unrelated.”4 In 
addition to controlling for the election year, these authors also control for Hispanic and Black 
voters, concluding that there is no statistically significant relationship between these voters and 
voter ID requirements.5  
While I do not take issue with Mycoff et al.’s research design, I do, however, question the 
reliability of this study given the present state of voter ID laws, as presented in Bentele & 
O’Brien and Herron & Smith’s different studies. In other words, I would be cautious of the 
study's conclusions as they may not reflect the current state of voter ID laws, given that the 
measure of reliability in Mycoff et al.’s assessment is limited to the early 2000s and does not 
consider the 2013 Shelby County v. Holder decision. While this is a new development not 
considered by Mycoff et al.’s study, it should be noted that in Table 3 of my results, both the 
African American (t = 2.29, p = 0.0235) and Hispanic adult (t = 5.47, p = 0) variables met the 
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requirements of statistical significance trending in a positive direction, indicating a positive 
correlation with voter turnout.  
A possible reason for this result is the different turnout rates from concentrating on three 
different elections. In fact, according to the Washington Post, the turnout rate for racial 
minorities was low in the 2014 midterms, while the turnout rate was high in the 2016 presidential 
election.6 That being said, while Hispanic turnout was growing from 2012 to 2016,7 African 
American turnout in 2016 decreased by a factor of 7% compared to 2012.8 However, the 2018 
midterm election saw the highest turnout rate of any midterm election since 1978, with about 122 
million citizens voting, or about half of the registered voting age population,9 which included 
Hispanics at a 40% turnout rate and African Americans at a 51.4% turnout rate.10 Perhaps the 
positive results reported in Table 3 are a reflection of the increases in the turnout rate over the 
course of these three election cycles and may even indicate a stronger presence of minority 
voting groups as a result of voter mobilization efforts and the salience of relevant political issues. 
This is not to say that voter ID laws have absolutely no negative effect on minority groups, given 
that the African American variable in Table 1 trended in a negative direction and that I am 
confident in my methodology of using a difference-in-difference test to uncover these results. As 
a matter of fact, other scholars and resources have also supported my original hypothesis, such as 
the Public Religion Research Institute’s (PRRI) poll, which finds that Hispanics are less likely to 
be familiar with the voting requirements for the state because of the English-Spanish language 
barrier.11 Specifically, 23% of Hispanic Americans, according to this PRRI poll, are “not sure 
about the eligibility of non-citizens to vote in their state,” and about 60% of Black Americans are 
not sure about their ability to vote under their state law if they are late in paying their 
taxes.12  PRRI’s poll supplements the work of Bentele & O’Brien and Herron & Smith by adding 
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the element of real-world difficulty directly from the groups that are the most impacted by these 
restrictive voter ID laws. Due to these conditions, I believe that other spurious elements are at 
work that affects the voter turnout rate in addition to the effects voter ID laws have on minority 
groups, including political salience of issues, grassroots mobilization, level of competition, and 
voting in opposition to the party in power. Given these new developments, it would be fair to 
reject the conclusions made by Mycoff et al. of there being no statistically significance between 
voting laws and racial minorities. Upon observing the results of previous and existing scholars 
and sources, my hypothesis is not totally supported by my findings. but I gather that voter ID 
laws still impact minorities negatively and that the positive results of Table 3 can be explained 
by other confounding factors at work during these election cycles. In this case, I would 
encourage future researchers to examine the relationships among these possible confounding 
connections, minority groups, and voter ID laws. 
Likewise, the strong results produced in Tables 1, 2, and 3 encourage me to examine the 
relationship between voter ID laws and their impact on female voter turnout. Given that there 
was a positive relationship in the first table and a strong negative effect in Tables 2 and 3, it is 
important to understand the effects present in these regression models. In terms of voter turnout, 
the overall turnout rate for the 2014 election was about 41%, with 43% of women making up the 
electorate.13 According to the Center for American Women and Politics (CAWP) at Rutgers 
University, women have voted in higher numbers compared to men dating back to the 1960s, 
with about 74 million women and 64 million men voting in the 2016 presidential election, which 
is about 63% of eligible female voters for that election.14 Additionally, the Census Bureau points 
out that 55% of voters in the 2018 midterm election were women, which accounts for a 12-
percentage point difference from the 2014 midterm election.15 Other writers and scholars add to 
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the Census and the CAWP’s data, such as Laurence Arnold of The Washington Post, who 
recognizes a Gallup poll illustrating the gender gap between female and male voters and how 
they vote for Democratic candidates, with more than half of women preferring the Democrat 
compared to about 40% of male voters.16 Similarly, according to the Pew Research Center, about 
60% of women voted for the Democratic candidate in the 2018 election.17  
With all of this information put together, I would agree that for the past several elections, 
more women have voted for the Democratic candidate over the Republican candidate, which is 
information about political preferences that may have influenced Republican legislatures’ 
decision-making in crafting these laws. While the data from these sources reveals that women 
vote in higher frequencies, the data from Tables 2 and 3 indicate that turnout was still negatively 
correlated with women voters while controlling for voter ID laws (t = -6,31, p = 2.17e-09), (t =  
-3.85, p = 0.0002), both with large negative coefficients. Regarding the size of the coefficients, I 
assume this is due to the fact that women are the largest voting bloc of all of the categories of 
voters in this study, which may yield a large coefficient quantity. While women are still voting in 
higher numbers, the presence of a voter ID law still has an overall negative affect on their 
turnout, which is a point documented in the existing literature.18 In other words, these findings 
provides partial support for my hypothesis that voter ID laws do correlate with lower turnout of 
female voters between the 2014 and 2018 elections. Given that this variable encapsulated all 
women, regardless of race or ethnicity, future research should be conducted on exploring the 
different races and ethnicities of women and their individual connection to voter ID laws. This 
research would aim to dispel misconceptions of women’s monolithic voting behavior and 
understand more about their political preferences. 
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My regression tables also produced fascinating results for the elderly adult variable, with 
it only reaching a slight statistical significance (t = 2.12, p = 0.0352) with a positive effect in 
Table 2, but two negative effects in Tables 1 (t = -3.20, p = 0.0016) and 3 (t = -2.70, p = 
0.0076). Since the 1980s, elderly voters have been a reliable and consistent voting bloc, with 
about 55% of the elderly voting in 2014, 70% voting in 2016 and 65% voting in 2018, according 
to an Election Project’s report.19 Overall, elderly voters over the age of 65 make up an average 
quarter share of the electorate between 2014 and 2016.20 Also, as pointed out in Figure 8, elderly 
adults make up a substantial portion of the population in the states being studied, with an average 
population of 14.4%. However, according to the results from Tables 1 and 3, voter turnout 
decreases as the value of the elderly voter variable increases. The existing literature can perhaps 
explain this in greater detail, especially Lawrence Norden of the Brennan Center’s Democracy 
Program, who states that the kinds of voter-ID laws that request photo identification negatively 
affect elderly voters in particular. He claims that "there's no question that citizens over 65 will be 
particularly impacted. The older you get, the more likely you won't have an ID," as about one in 
five citizens over the age of 65 do not possess a government-issued ID.21 Baretto et al. extend 
Norden’s statistics in their report, where these authors study the voter-ID law accessibilities in 
Indiana and find that the elderly face a disproportionate challenge in obtaining a driver’s license 
compared to voters in other age groups.22 In fact, Baretto et al. clearly show that this 
phenomenon is fairly universal across the country, with voters 65 years of age or older voting in 
lower numbers in recent years, particularly in Western states.23 Baretto et.al’s observation of 
comparably low turnout connects with Norden’s assessment of the lack of accessibility to 
driver’s licenses and other government-approved photo IDs. While this compliments my findings 
from Tables 1 and 3 of lower turnout, Table 2 reported slight statistical significance with a 
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positive effect of the elderly adults variable while controlling for other demographic variables in 
2016 and 2018. Perhaps this change is a result of the fluctuations of more elderly citizens voting 
in the 2018 midterms than the 2014 midterms and, as such, this table is reporting the result of 
that change. One interesting feature not discussed at great length in the literature is the affiliation 
of the elderly population to any one particular party, perhaps because this age group does not 
express a unanimous voting behavior and has, in fact, seen shifting party preferences over the 
past few years, according to Chalabi of The Guardian.24 Although I cannot conclusively assert 
that this age group supports one political party over another, I can instead interpret, based on the 
evidence outlined in the existing literature and in my own models, that elderly adults experience 
negative consequences in turnout and greater difficulties voting in states with voter ID laws, 
which supports my hypothesis. 
Before I ran my regression models, I theorized that voter ID laws would have a 
discriminatory effect on three particular variables based on their economic scarcity: high school 
education attainment, unemployment status, and low median household income. With respect to 
the high school education attainment variable, evidence from Table 3 reports a strong positive 
correlation while controlling for a voter ID law (t = 4.15, p = 0.0001), whereas Tables 1 and 2 
did not reach the level of statistical significance. In order to understand why the other two 
variables experienced this phenomenon, I turn to Nagler’s analysis of individual voting behavior. 
He controls for education level and states that “individuals with a high school education are more 
affected by registration requirements than individuals without a high school degree.”25 Nagler 
adds more evidence to my original hypothesis of lower educated people being affected by these 
laws and requirements, which is also assisted by Steven Tenn’s study on education and its 
relationship to voter turnout. Tenn constructs a difference-in-difference test comparing 
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individuals’ age and education of one year to individuals of the previous year using the Current 
Population Survey to prove the effect of education. After finding a 6.8 percentage point impact 
of the voting process on students registering to vote, Tenn summarizes that “being a student has 
a significant positive impact on both voter turnout and voter registration.”26 This suggests that 
those who obtain a college-level experience have a greater likelihood of turning out to vote as 
opposed to those who only retain a high school education or lower. One could assume that 
Nagler would agree with Tenn’s findings and concur that a higher education level attainment 
yields a positive impact on those who would be more likely to turnout to vote. I also find Tenn’s 
research design to be sound because of his usage of a difference-in-difference test, which I am 
confident was the best approach for both of our papers. In terms of the relationship between 
these authors’ points and my own findings, Table 3 reports that over the course of three elections 
between 2014 and 2018, high school-educated adults have been voting in higher numbers (t = 
4.15, p = 0.0001). In fact, the Pew Research Center finds that in 2016, 63% of the electorate was 
made up of those who did not receive a college education, though they do not specify the age of 
citizens in this category.27 It should additionally be noted that Tables 1 and 2 both did not 
produce statistically significant results for this variable, as the t-values were low and the p-values 
were high both at 0.14 and 0.9787 respectively. I interpret this output as there being no 
relationship present between these two election years, as the null is unable to be rejected and the 
execution of my testing design did not change. Also, the positive effect in the regression in Table 
3 is small and does seem to reflect the difference a voting base can make on election outcomes. 
Given how my predictions here were not fully supported and my study does not concentrate on 
college-level voters or higher, future studies should consider focusing on voters of all education 
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attainment categories and ages in recent elections and learn more about their voting behavior in 
states with voter ID laws.  
One of the variables I was surprised to find not meeting the level of statistical 
significance was the unemployment status variable in Tables 2 and 3. However, the variable did 
cross that threshold (t = 3.25, p = 0.0014) in Table 1, between the 2014 and 2016 election. I 
have attempted to understand this effect from scholars who provide research in this area such as 
Steven Rosenstone, for instance, who assesses the effect of economic recessions on voter 
turnout. He observes and catalogues the various changes in median household income using data 
from the 1970 Current Population Survey and finds that “a 10 percent increase in the proportion 
of the electorate that is worse off financially reduces turnout by 2.5 percent.”28 The author makes 
the argument that as the number of poor and unemployed people rise, then the voter turnout will 
decrease. Rosenstone arrives at the conclusion that economic adversity reduces voter turnout, 
especially when the number of economically disadvantaged people is increasing.29 Filer et al. 
build off Rosenstone’s study by connecting unemployed citizens to those in the lowest income 
bracket, who participate less in political activity than those who earn more income. These 
important findings highlight the difficulties that certain voters face during economically adverse 
conditions. Perhaps the fact that the economy has improved relative to 2014 explains the increase 
in voter turnout. To put this into perspective, the unemployment in 2014 was high at 5.6%, but 
dropped to 4.7% in 2016, and dropped again to 3.9% in 2018.30 In other words, the increase of 
unemployed voter participation between the two years due to an improving economy seems to be 
the most likely reason for the positive results reported in Table 1. Consequently, my prediction 
and hypothesis of the unemployed experiencing a lower turnout seems not to apply to this 
variable as turnout increased with this group. 
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Lastly, the low median household income variable reached statistical significance in a 
positive direction in Table 1 (t = -2.82, p = 0.0053) and a negative direction in Table 2 (t = 4.77, 
p = 3.84e-06), with Table 3 not reporting any statistically significant relationship for the variable 
and with voter turnout changes. This result was a surprise to me, as I had expected there to be a 
more statistically significant output negatively correlating low income with voter turnout while 
controlling for voter ID laws. Perhaps the work of Daniel Weeks, the former president of 
Americans for Campaign Reform, can shine some light on this disparity between the two tables. 
Weeks’ research focused on how low income people have little influence on their elected 
representatives, with “just two percent of Americans at the bottom of the income and education 
ladder attend[ing] campaign meetings and rallies or conduct[ing] campaign work, compared to 
14 percent of people at the top—a factor of seven to one.”31 Weeks’ findings suggest that lower 
income citizens have less influence than higher income citizens on the political agenda. Weeks 
points out a theme echoed in Filer et al.’s analysis of high income citizens who participate more 
in elections than low income people, generally stating that “turnout rises as income increases” 32. 
With this observation, those with lower income are already at a disadvantage compared to voters 
at a higher socioeconomic status. Baretto et al. possess the essence of these authors while 
focusing more on voter ID laws and find that after performing a chi-square test that voter ID 
laws significantly lower one’s opportunity to vote, including those who are low income.33 These 
authors provide the literature to partially support my prediction of low income citizens and low 
turnout, especially how it applies to the positive effect in Table 2, representing the years of 2016 
and 2018.  
While Filer et al. and Weeks suggest that this group of people were already voting in 
lower numbers, I argue that this group is still disadvantaged by voter ID laws. The ACLU and 
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the Brennan Center unanimously agree that low income citizens are vulnerable to voter ID 
laws.34 Both organizations cite Richard Sobel’s 2014 study on the cost of accessing a voter photo 
identification card, stating that on a national scale among the states with voter ID laws, the 
expenses for “free” voter IDs could cost generally lower income voters a collective half a billion 
dollars, which as he puts it would “impoverish our democracy.”35 To put Sobel’s argument into 
perspective, even in a situation where states offer voter ID cards to those who cannot obtain a 
driver’s license, the costs would be unfairly leveraged to low-income citizens. While these 
groups are already voting in lower numbers due to other class-based influences on their voting 
ability, photo-ID requirements also impact their turnout, as reflected from the data in Table 1 (t = 
-2.82, p = 0.0053). In terms of the positive result of Table 1, I believe that this is a result of 
disparities in turnout differences from the 2014 and 2016 elections and perhaps efforts made by 
politicians and campaigns to turnout low income voters in order to win elections. Additionally, 
the voter ID law independent variable itself produced two negative statistically significant results 
in Table 2 and 3, which perhaps indicates the level of voter turnout decrease due to these law 
being put in place. 
While I am confident in my analysis of voter ID laws and voter turnout, I think it is also 
worth pointing out the possibility of any confounding factors and variables impacting these 
changes in turnout. To begin, I look to scholars for any countering relationships that may exist in 
this study, including the role of election officials and their administrations and how they directly 
influence voters at the local-level, given that much of my data consists of county-level results. 
Hale et al. emphasize the direct connection between election administrations and their voters, as 
these authors address the need for major reform in intergovernmental activity through these 
organizations. They claim that there has been a sense of “diffuse responsibility” and a 
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“decentralized environment” among the system of election boards in the early 2000s, further 
implying the need for a major overhaul of the system itself.36 While one could argue that the 
conclusions in Hale et al.’s study are outdated from two decades ago, the Brennan Center makes 
a similar argument, claiming that these administrations are still largely decentralized with several 
systemic flaws.37 Montjoy builds off Hale et al.’s point and the Brennan Center’s report by 
revealing how this lack of appropriate and effective management from local election boards 
directly affects the elections themselves, with more than half of election administrations 
experiencing problems of training, recruiting volunteer poll workers, and even securing spaces 
for poll stations for election day.38 Although these studies take place before the timeframe of this 
study, both Montjoy and Hale et al. express how a governing body encounters challenges 
managing local elections, which possibly explains turnout differences in the 185 observed 
counties between 2014 and 2018.  
That being said, Kimball et al. attribute partisanship to these local-level election boards, 
as they specifically look at these organizations’ impact on provisional voting in the 2004 general 
elections.39 More precisely, Kimball et al. examine approximately 4,612 top election officials at 
the local-level across the country, as well as state laws crafted by political parties, with data 
supplemented from the U.S. Election Assistance Commission’s Election Day Survey.40 In this 
study, these authors find evidence of “partisanship in the selection of state rules governing the 
counting of provisional ballots [and also] conditional partisan effects in the casting and counting 
of provisional ballots.”41 In fact, Kimball et al.’s study captures the polarization within these 
political election administrations, claiming that “provisional votes were less likely to be cast and 
counted in strongly Democratic jurisdictions if the local election official was a Republican,” 
thereby implying a bias against Democrats.42 This observation does not surprise me, as it reflects 
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my assumptions of local governments’ partisanship and how these political attitudes, in turn, 
influence the laws created to target likely Democratic voters. Perhaps the fact that a majority of 
these election officials are individually voted in by constituents incentivizes them to act as 
politicians by appealing to voters in order to secure their seat on the board through political 
means. Kimball et.al’s assessment of the political undertones of election administrations stresses 
a recurring theme in my paper: the growing partisan behavior of government and their desire to 
create and pass biased laws that discriminate against the opposing party. To put it another way, 
the actions of election administrations, including their managing of elections and implementing 
voter ID laws, serve political purposes and undermine Democratic voters, which presents a 
spurious possibility to the predictions and hypotheses I laid out in my research. 
One could also point to the advances in voting technology as an alternative reason for the 
impact on voter turnout in addition to election administrations. As Alters & Kooreman make 
clear in their study, the advent of touch screen technology in the electoral system negatively 
affects voter turnout, perhaps due to their tabulation methods of counting ballots.43 Alters & 
Kooreman study provisional ballots and find that electronic voting lowers the proportion of 
residual votes.44 In other words, Alters & Kooreman’s investigation of these new voting 
technologies has a negative effect on voter turnout of certain provisional voters, which does 
present a dilemma to my argument laid out in this thesis by introducing this confounding 
prospect. Alters & Kooreman does not control for any demographic categories of voters who 
may be more impacted by these touchscreen voting technologies, instead only looking at left-
leaning voters between 2000 and 2004. Roseman & Stephenson, however, present literature that 
is related more to the variables that I controlled for in my models, as they both look at the effects 
of voting technology on elderly voters and their turnout in Georgia’s state-wide races.45 These 
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authors predict that older voters would be more apprehensive to “computerized voting” 
technologies than older voting machines.46 Roseman & Stephenson conduct a difference-in-
difference test on Georgia's 1998 and 2002 gubernatorial elections while controlling for elderly 
turnout, as well as the percentage of black and lower educated voters, similar to my own model 
and testing choice.47 These authors found that the difference in turnout and the demographic 
control variables all have a negative impact on the turnout of elderly voters, concluding that 
voting technology decreases elderly voter turnout.48 Roseman & Stephenson’s evidence serves as 
a precursor to Alters & Kooreman’s findings on the negative impact of touchscreen technology 
on voters. Alters & Kooreman prove that voting technologies inhibit the voter turnout, which 
perhaps explains the negative effect of elderly voters and voter turnout found in Table 1 and 3 (t 
= -3.20, p = 0.0016) (t = -2.70, p = 0.0076), which is found through the use of the difference-in-
difference test. Several of the states in my study have incorporated the kind of technology Alters 
& Kooreman control for in their study,49 which opens up a possibility for a confounding 
connection.  
Lastly, the role that election and public officials play in swaying public thinking can 
certainly be an influential factor in the turnout of the groups I controlled for in this study. While 
states vary in their implementation of voter ID laws, the rhetoric from politicians remains 
consistent, much of it circling around the idea of securing the integrity of the ballot box and 
protecting the election from fraud and deceit. As stated earlier in this paper, Governor Nikki 
Haley of South Carolina defended her voter ID bill by equating it to showing photo ID at the 
drug store,50 thereby personalizing the problem of voter fraud. Similar remarks were made by 
governors and state legislators around the country, all pointing to voter fraud as a threat to the 
integrity of the voting system. In fact, voter fraud is not only a frequent excuse for Republican 
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lawmakers to justify the implementation of voter ID requirements, but it is also, in reality, an 
overexaggerated myth instigated by these officials. The Brennan Center released a report on the 
realities of voter fraud, finding that it is “extraordinarily rare,” at a rate of up to 0.0025%,51 
proving how the voter fraud argument is itself fraudulent and misleading. Despite these 
arguments and inaccuracies, Republican politicians use this rhetoric to enact photo identification 
legislation in the states they govern, which directly impacts those who do not meet the photo 
identification requirements, as the PRRI survey reported.52 According to a Washington Post-
ABC News poll, 46% of voters describe voter fraud as a frequent issue in elections,53 which 
suggests that this rhetoric appears to be having an effect on public opinion. While the rhetoric 
from top public officials can be seen as confounding the relationship I explored in this paper, I 
also interpret this pattern as a Republican strategy to ensure their victory in critical elections by 
passing state voter ID laws that aim to suppress voters and utilizing rhetorical strategies to justify 
their enacting of these laws. In sum, it is fair to suggest that this rhetoric, though introducing a 
confounding relationship to my study, serves a political purpose to justify these bills and 
disenfranchise voters as part of a larger rhetorical strategy to undermine voters.  
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Recommendations & Conclusions 
 As stated earlier in this paper, this research fits well into the existing literature of voter 
identification laws by connecting the implementation of 2014 – 2018 voter ID laws to the turnout 
of certain groups of Americans. This points to a larger strategy by the Republican party to ensure 
the consistent victory of competitive races over Democratic candidates. The reasoning for this 
strategy seems to be motivated by partisan intentions to suppress future victories of the opposing 
party. After all, these laws increased after the contentious 2000 election and certainly increased 
after Democratic nominee Barack Obama’s victory in 2008, in which he won many of the swing 
states observed in this paper, not to mention that many competitive races across the country were 
also won by Democrats at that time. One could also point to the opportunity to shape the long-
term political landscape as a reason for creating these new voting requirements, as these laws 
would make it possible for Republicans to place members of their own party in pivotal agencies 
and organizations to enact policies that would favor their agenda and benefit their party’s 
control. Additionally, election officials utilized strategic timing to craft voter ID bills that were 
signed into state law ahead of major elections. To put it another way, Republicans have 
implemented these laws in response to Democratic victories in the 2000s, thereby revealing 
political motivations. Although the overall hypothesis of all of the control groups experiencing 
negative effects is not full supported, this research findings negative turnout rate while 
controlling for a voter ID law during different election cycles, which is ample evidence to 
suggest the impact these voter ID laws have on a variety of American citizens. 
In order to correct the limitations in this paper, I would encourage future researchers to 
consider several factors. Firstly, in collecting the top ten most populous counties from each of 
the 19 observed states, I aimed to collect a representative sample of the population residing in 
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these states. However, I believe that this may have resulted in a skewed data collection that 
recognizes more urbanized communities rather than rural ones, which may have also impacted 
the political makeup of the collected sample as well. Future research should amend this potential 
problem by expanding my design and collecting data from all of the counties in the observed 
states so as to obtain a wider representative sample of the population. Secondly, in running future 
regressions that use a variable representing voter ID laws, one should consider distinguishing the 
different types of voter ID laws, as well as their level of strictness and the specific forms of 
identification that are allowed at the polls. For example, if one were to consider voter ID laws 
and their relationship to age, they should take a particular look at what kinds of IDs are allowed 
for senior-citizens and other age groups, given that there may be limits in securing proper forms 
of ID like driver’s licenses and student ID cards to meet their state’s requirements. In making 
this adjustment, future researchers will be able to predict how the kinds of IDs requested in 
certain states impact voters’ ability to cast their ballots in states while controlling for 
age. Thirdly, in terms of the demographic variables for this study, there were slight limitations in 
gauging the specific subgroups under each variable, such as the different types of ethnicities for 
the racial categories, age of female adults, and more. Future studies should break down the broad 
demographic categories explored in this paper to understand the differences in voter turnout 
behavior as well as their political preferences. 
While these research recommendations are worthwhile for conducting tests on possibly 
correlated relationships in the future, they do not address the larger systemic issues underlying in 
the electoral system, which require reforms. First, I recommend oversight of these election 
administrations’ activities to ensure that their actions are being conducted without any political 
intent. In this same vein, I would encourage state governments to ensure that their election 
Levy 75 
administration officials run without a political party affiliation attached to them, akin to 
Abramowitz et al.’s suggestion, which would remove the incentive of appealing to certain voters. 
If no changes are made in this regard, then the lack of funding and leadership will continue to 
leave the possibility of partisan behavior open in influencing election outcomes. Montjoy 
expertly highlighted the lack of appropriate management and organization of these election 
boards, implying that if these boards were properly funded by the state and were run with more 
effective leaders, then the flaws present in local elections would be minimized. Of course, not 
every state and locality can achieve this ultimate goal because of differences in funding and 
government capability, but if this recommendation were to be implemented in a non-partisan 
fashion, then the improvements will benefit the electoral system and voters of future elections by 
not creating a biased institution. Second, I referenced the concerns of touch-screen technology 
deterring elderly voters, which I believe should be rectified. I recommend state governments 
invest in voting technology that includes a more user-friendly interface, which would aim to 
correct the problem of low turnout from elderly voters by not making the prospect of new voting 
technology would turn away elderly voters, as Roseman & Stephenson highlight. The execution 
of this change would depend on the effective leadership of the state government and a non-
partisan election board, who would ensure the safe rollout of these new machines without any 
political incentive. 
Overall, I conclude that in the most recent major elections, voter ID laws impacted the 
turnout of certain American citizens, specifically minorities, people of color, women, the elderly, 
and people of a low socioeconomic status. These laws are partisan in nature, designed to 
suppress voter turnout, and are part of Republican legislatures seeking to maintain control of 
political power in their communities by attempting to limit turnout, which ultimately undermines 
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likely Democratic voters. While this study largely models the design of Burden et al.’s 2017 
paper of voting behavior, I add new insight and data on present-day voter identification laws 
actively influencing turnout to the existing literature. Ultimately, my work illustrates how the 
new developments to the American voting system are, in fact, obstacles that create challenges for 
certain groups of citizens who wish to exercise their right to vote. The integrity of our democracy 
can only be secured and be to able function properly if the right to vote is protected from these 
suppressive measures. 
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